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Abstract
How do macro-financial shocks affect investor behavior and market dynamics?
Recent evidence on experience effects suggests a long-lasting influence of person-
ally experienced outcomes on investor beliefs and investment, but also significant
differences across older and younger generations. We formalize experience-based
learning in an OLG model, where different cross-cohort experiences generate per-
sistent heterogeneity in beliefs, portfolio choices, and trade. The model allows us
to characterize a novel link between investor demographics and the dependence of
prices on past dividends, while also generating known features of asset prices, such
as excess volatility and return predictability. The model produces new implications
for the cross-section of asset holdings, trade volume, and investors’ heterogenous
responses to recent financial crises, which we show to be in line with the data.
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1 Introduction
Recent crises in the stock and housing markets have stimulated a new wave of macro-
finance models of risk-taking. A key challenge, and motivation, has been to find tractable
models of investor expectations that account not only for asset-pricing puzzles such as
return predictability (Campbell and Shiller (1988), Fama and French (1988)) and excess
volatility (LeRoy and Porter (1981), Shiller (1981), LeRoy (2005)), but also for micro-
level stylized facts such as investors chasing past performances. As argued by Woodford
(2013), the empirical evidence suggests a need for dynamic models that go beyond the
rational-expectations hypothesis. In line with Woodford’s proposal, models of natural
expectation formation (Fuster, Hebert, and Laibson (2011); Fuster, Laibson, and Mendel
(2010)) and over-extrapolation (Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (2015); Barberis,
Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (2016)) successfully capture a wide range of the stylized
facts. A core feature of these models is that agents over-weigh recent realizations of the
relevant economic variables when forming beliefs.
Another set of emerging stylized facts which focuses on the long-lasting effects of
macro-financial shocks and their systematic cross-sectional differences, has been harder
to capture by these approaches. As conveyed by the notion of “depression babies” or
the “deep scars” of the 2008 financial crisis (Blanchard (2012), Malmendier and Shen
(2017)), macro-economic shocks appear to alter investment and consumption behavior
for decades to come, beyond the time frame of existing models, and there is significant
cross-sectional heterogeneity. Younger cohorts tend to react significantly more strongly
than older cohorts. The growing empirical literature on experience effects documents, for
example, that personal lifetime experiences in the stock-market predict future willingness
to invest in the stock market (Malmendier and Nagel (2011)), and the same for IPO ex-
periences and future IPO investment (Kaustia and Knu¨pfer (2008); Chiang, Hirshleifer,
Qian, and Sherman (2011)). There is also evidence of experience effects in non-finance
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settings, e. g., on the long-term effects of graduating in a recession on labor market out-
comes (Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2012)) or of living in (communist) Eastern
Germany to political attitudes post-reunification (Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007)).1
In all of these applications, researchers identify a long-lasting impact of crisis experiences
on individual risk-taking and illustrate their cohort-specific impact.
Much of the evidence on experience effects pertains directly to stated beliefs, e. g.,
beliefs about future stock returns (in the UBS/Gallup data), about future inflation (in
the Michigan Survey of Consumers), or about the outlook for durable consumption (also
in the MSC).2 A key difference relative to over-extrapolation and related approaches is
that experience-based learning generates cohort-specific differences in beliefs and in their
updating after a common shock. While more evidence on the exact process of household-
level learning is needed (see the discussions in Campbell (2008) and Agarwal, Driscoll,
Gabaix, and Laibson (2013)), the over-weighing of personal experiences appears to be
a pervasive and robust psychological phenomenon affecting belief formation, which is
related to availability bias as first put forward by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), as well
as the extensive evidence on the different effects of description versus experience.3
This growing empirical literature on experience effects and its strong psychological un-
derpinning raise the question whether experience-based learning and the implied dynamic
cross-cohort differences have the potential to explain aggregate dynamics. For example,
which generations invest in the stock market and how much? What are the dynamics of
stock market investment? How will the market react to a macro-shock?
Our paper develops an equilibrium model of asset markets that formalizes experience-
based learning and the resulting belief heterogeneity across investors. The model clarifies
1 See also Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2013), who relate the effects of growing up in a recession to
redistribution preferences.
2 Cf. Malmendier and Nagel (2011), Malmendier and Nagel (2016), Malmendier and Shen (2017).
3 See, for example, Weber, Bo¨ckenholt, Hilton, and Wallace (1993), Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and
Erev (2004), and Simonsohn, Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Ariely (2008).
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the channels through which past realizations affect future market outcomes by pinning
down the effect on investors’ own belief formation and the interaction with other genera-
tions’ belief formation. We derive the aggregate implications of learning from experience
and the implied cross-sectional differences in investor behavior. To our knowledge, this
model is the first to tease out the tension between experience effects and recency bias,
including the stronger reactions of the young than the old to a given macro shock. It aims
to provide a guide for testing to what extent experience-based learning can enhance our
understanding of market dynamics and of the long-term effect of demographic changes.
The key model features are as follows. We consider a stylized overlapping generations
(OLG) equilibrium model. Agents have CARA preferences and live for a finite number of
periods.4 During their lifetimes, they choose portfolios of a risky and a risk-free security.
We assume that agents maximize their per-period payoffs, i. e., are myopic.5 The risky
asset is in unit net supply and pays a random dividend every period. The risk-free asset
is in infinitely elastic supply and pays a fixed return. Investors do not know the true
mean of dividends, but learn about it by observing the history of dividends.
We begin by characterizing the benchmark economy in which agents know the true
mean of dividends. In this setting, there is no heterogeneity, and thus the demands of
all active market participants are equal and constant over time. Furthermore, there is a
unique no-bubble equilibrium with constant prices.
We then introduce experience-based learning. The assumed belief formation process
captures the two main empirical features of experience effects: First, agents over-weigh
their lifetime experiences. Second, their beliefs exhibit recency bias. We identify two
4 The use of CARA preferences with Normal shocks allows us to keep our theoretical analysis tractable,
and is widely used in finance for this reason (see Vives (2010)).
5 Myopic agents omit the correlation between their next-period payoff and their continuation value
function. This yields behavior that is analogous to the commonly used assumption of short-term traders
(see Vives (2010)). In a previous version of the paper, available on https://arxiv.org/pdf/1612.09553.pdf,
we show that, when the myopia assumption is removed, the first-order effects of experience-based learning
are identical to those derived for myopic agents.
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channels through which past dividends affect market outcomes. The first channel is the
belief-formation process: shocks to dividends shape agents’ beliefs about future dividends.
Hence, individual demands depend on personal experiences, and the equilibrium price is
a function of the history of dividends observed by the oldest market participant. The
second channel is the generation of cross-sectional heterogeneity: different lifetime experi-
ences generate persistent differences in beliefs. Agents “agree to disagree.” Furthermore,
younger cohorts react more strongly to a dividend shock than older cohorts as it makes
up a larger part of their lifetimes. A positive shock induces younger cohorts to invest rel-
atively more in the risky asset, while a negative shock tilts the composition towards older
cohorts. Thus, the model has implications for the time series of trade volume: Changes
in the level of disagreement between cohorts lead to higher trade volume in equilibrium.
The model captures an interesting tension between heterogeneity in personal expe-
riences (which generates belief heterogeneity across cohorts) and recency bias (which
reduces belief heterogeneity). When there is strong recency bias, all agents pay a lot of
attention to the most recent dividends. Thus, their reactions to a recent shock are similar.
Price volatility increases, while price auto-correlation and trade volume decrease. The
opposite holds when the recency bias is weak, and agents form their beliefs using their ex-
perienced history. Hence, the reaction of prices and trade volume to changes in dividends
is tightly linked to the relative extent of recency bias versus experience-based differences
across cohorts in a given market, which are in turn influenced by demographics.
We explore the connection between market demographics and the dependence of prices
on past dividends by analyzing the effect of a one-time change in the fraction of young
agents that participate in the market. We find that the demographic composition of
markets significantly influences the dependence of prices on past dividends. For example,
when the market participation of the young relative to the old increases, the relative
reliance of prices on more recent dividends increases. This is in line with evidence in
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Cassella and Gulen (2015) who find that the level of extrapolation in markets is posi-
tively related to the fraction of young traders in that market, and with Collin-Dufresne,
Johannes, and Lochstoer (2016) who find that the price-divided ratio is higher and more
sensitive to macro-shocks when the ratio of young to old market participants is larger.
We then turn to several tests of the empirical implications of our model. First, we show
that the model accommodates several key asset pricing features identified in prior liter-
ature. We follow the approach in Campbell and Kyle (1993) and Barberis, Greenwood,
Jin, and Shleifer (2015) to contrast CARA-model moments with the data. We show the
CARA-model analogues of return predictability (Campbell and Shiller (1988)) and of
predictability of the dividend-price ratio. This predictability of future price changes (and
dividend-price ratio changes) stems solely from the experience-based learning mechanism
rather than, say, a built-in dependence on dividends or past returns, and it depends on
the demographic structure of the market. Similarly, the model generates excess volatility
in prices and price changes as established by LeRoy and Porter (1981), Shiller (1981),
and LeRoy (2005), above and beyond the stochastic structure of the dividend process.
Experience-based learning generates new predictions for the cross-section of asset hold-
ings and trade volume, which we test in the data. Using the representative sample of
the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), merged with data from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) and historical data on stock-market performance, we first
replicate and extend the evidence in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) on stock-market par-
ticipation. We show that cross-cohort differences in lifetime stock-market experiences
predict cohort differences in stock-market participation and in the fraction of liquid as-
sets invested in the stock market. In other words, cross-cohort differences both on the
extensive and on the intensive margin of stock market participation vary over time as
predicted by the time series of cross-cohort differences in lifetime experiences. We then
turn to the predictions regarding trade volume, and show that the de-trended turnover
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ratio is strongly correlated with differences in lifetime market experiences across cohorts.
That is, changes in the experience-based level of disagreement between cohorts predict
higher abnormal trade volume, as predicted by the model.
Overall, experience-based learning offers a unifying explanation for financial-market
features of both prices and trade volume. It also has novel implications for the cross-
sectional differences in market participation and portfolio choice, which we show are
consistent with the data.
Related Literature. There is a wide literature on the role of learning in explaining
asset pricing puzzles. Most closely related, Cogley and Sargent (2008) propose a model
in which the representative consumer uses Bayes’ theorem to update estimates of tran-
sition probabilities as realizations accrue. As in our paper, agents use less data than
a “rational-expectations-without-learning econometrician” would give them. There are
two important differences in our setup. First, agents are not Bayesian. Second, different
cohorts have different, finite experiences. Consequently, observations during an agent’s
lifetime have a non-negligible effect on beliefs and generate cross-cohort heterogeneity.
Our paper also relates to the work on extrapolation by Barberis, Greenwood, Jin,
and Shleifer (2015) and Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (2016). They consider a
consumption-based asset pricing model with both “rational” and “extrapolative” agents.
The latter believe that positive price changes will be followed by positive changes. In
contrast, the heterogeneity in extrapolation in our model is linked to the demographic
structure of the market. In addition, while cross-sectional heterogeneity in their model
arises from the presence of both “rational” and “extrapolative” infinitely-lived agents,
in our model, it results from the different experiences of different finitely-lived cohorts.
This allows us to generate predictions about the cross-section of asset holdings and the
relation between extrapolation and demographics in line with the data.
More generally, our paper relates to the large asset-pricing literature that departs from
6
the correct-beliefs paradigm. For instance, Barsky and DeLong (1993), Timmermann
(1993), Timmermann (1996), Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2012) study the implications of
learning and Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000) and Jin (2015) of distorted beliefs for stock-
return volatility and predictability, the equity premia, and booms and busts in markets.
At the same time, our approach is different from asset pricing models with asymmetric
information, as surveyed in Brunnermeier (2001). While in these models agents want
to learn the information their counter-parties hold, in our model of experienced-based
learning, information is available to all agents at all times.
Finally, there are contemporaneous papers that also explore the macroeconomic ef-
fects of learning-from-experience in OLG models. Schraeder (2015) focuses on how it
impacts high-frequency trading patters, such as overreaction and reversal, while Ehling,
Graniero, and Heyerdahl-Larsen (2018) analyze the trend-chasing behavior of the young
and its implications for risk-premia and the risk-free rate. More closely related to our
work, Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2016) explore the role of demographics
on asset pricing features, such as return predictability and excess volatility. Our pa-
per contributes to this literature in several respects. First, we allow for recency bias in
the belief formation process, as both the underlying psychology literature on availability
bias (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)) and the prior empirical literature on experience
effects identify it as an important component of how individuals assign weights to pre-
viously experienced outcomes. Allowing for recency bias turns out to be also of interest
theoretically, as the analysis reveals that an increase in recency bias reduce the cross-
sectional heterogeneity driven by the experiential learning bias. Second, our agents are
not Bayesian and do not update their posterior variance as they gain experience, and
thus our results do not depend on heterogeneous posterior variances.6 Third, our CARA-
6 Once we depart from the Bayesian paradigm, nothing guarantees that our agents understand that
more information increases the precision of their beliefs. If this was the case, for example, one should
expect agents to also incorporate past data.
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normal framework allows us to obtain closed-form solutions to clearly understand the
link between demographics, experience, and recency. Finally, we consider our empirical
approach more comprehensive, as we test the model predictions about portfolio holdings,
asset pricing features, and trade volume.
There is also a large literature that proposes other mechanisms, such as borrowing
constraints or life-cycle considerations, as the link from demographics to asset prices and
other equilibrium quantities. We view these other mechanisms as complementary to our
paper. They are omitted for the sake of tractability of the model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First we present the model setup
and the notion of experience-based learning in Section 2. We illustrate the mechanics
of the model in a simplified setting in Section 3. The main results are in Section 4. In
Section 5 we extend the model to study demographic shocks and in Section 6 we present
empirical implications. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model Set-Up
Consider an infinite-horizon economy with overlapping generations of a continuum of
risk-averse agents. At each point in time t ∈ Z, a new generation is born and lives for q
periods, q ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}. Hence, there are q+1 generations alive at any t. The generation
born at t = n is called generation n. Each generation has a mass of q−1 identical agents.
Agents have CARA preferences with risk aversion γ. They can transfer resources
across time by investing in financial markets. Trading takes place at the beginning of
each period. At the end of the last period of their lives, agents consume the wealth they
have accumulated. We use nq to indicate the last time at which generation n trades,
nq = n+ q− 1. (If the generation is denoted by t we use tq.) Figure 1 illustrates the time
line of this economy for two-period lived generations (q = 2).
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There is a risk-free asset, which is in perfectly elastic supply and has a gross return
of R > 1 at all times. And there is a single risky asset (a Lucas tree), which is in unit
net supply and pays a random dividend dt ∼ N (θ, σ2) at time t. To model uncertainty
about fundamentals, we assume that agents do not know the true mean of dividends θ
and use past observations to estimate it. To keep the model tractable, we assume that
the variance of dividends σ2 is known at all times.
For each generation n ∈ Z, the budget constraint at any time t ∈ {n, ..., n+ q} is
W nt = x
n
t pt + a
n
t , (1)
where W nt denotes the wealth of generation n at time t, x
n
t is the investment in the risky
asset (units of Lucas tree output), ant is the amount invested in the riskless asset, and pt
is the price of one unit of the risky asset at time t. As a result, wealth next period is
W nt+1 = x
n
t (pt+1 + dt+1) + a
n
tR = x
n
t (pt+1 + dt+1 − ptR) +W nt R. (2)
We denote the excess payoff received in t+ 1 from investing at time t in one unit of the
risky asset, relative to the riskless asset, as st+1 ≡ pt+1 + dt+1 − ptR. This is analogous
to the equity premium in our CARA-model. Using this notation, W nt+1 = x
n
t st+1 +W
n
t R.
We assume that agents maximize their per-period utility (i. e., are myopic). This
assumption simplifies the maximization problem considerably and highlights the main
determinants of portfolio choice generated by experience-based learning.
For a given initial wealth level W nn , the problem of a generation n at each time t ∈
{n, ..., nq} is to choose xnt to maximize Ent [− exp(−γW nt+1)], and hence
xnt ∈ arg max
x∈R
Ent [− exp(−γxst+1)] . (3)
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t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
(t− 2)-cohort
consumes
(t− 1)-cohort
trades
(t− 1)-cohort
consumes
t-cohort
is born and trades
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trades
t-cohort
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(t+ 1)-cohort
is born and trades
(t+ 1)-cohort
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(t+ 2)-cohort
trades
(t+ 3)-cohort
trades
Figure 1: A time line for an economy with two-period lived generations, q = 2.
where Ent [·] is the (subjective) expectation with respect to a Gaussian distribution with
variance σ2 and a mean denoted by θnt . We call θ
n
t the subjective mean of dividends, and
we define it below. Note that, when xnt is negative, generation n is short-selling.
2.1 Experience-Based Learning
In this framework, experienced-based learning (EBL) means that agents over-weigh real-
izations observed during their lifetimes when forecasting dividends, and that they may tilt
the excess weights towards the most recent observations. For simplicity, we assume that
agents only use observations realized during their lifetimes.7 That is, even though they
observe the entire history of dividends, they choose to disregard earlier observations.8
EBL differs from reinforcement learning-type models in two ways. First, as already
discussed, EBL agents understand the model and know all the primitives except the
mean of the dividend process. Hence, they do not learn about the equilibrium, they learn
7 We only need agents to discount pre-lifetime relative to lifetime observations for our results to hold.
8 In our full-information setting, prices do not add any additional information. While it is possible
to add private information and learning from prices to our framework, these (realistic) feature would
complicate matters without necessarily adding new intuition.
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in equilibrium. Second, EBL is a passive learning problem in the sense that players’
actions do not affect the information they receive. This would be different if we had,
say, a participation decision that links an action (participate or not) to the type of data
obtained for learning. We consider this to be an interesting line to explore in the future.
Let m denote the prior belief about the mean of dividends that agents are born with,
and where we restrict m to be Gaussian with mean θ for tractability. With this, we con-
struct the subjective mean of dividends of generation n at time t following the empirical
evidence on Malmendier and Nagel (2011) as follows
θnt ≡ (1− ωage) ·m+ ωage ·
age∑
k=0
w(k, λ, age)dt−k, (4)
where age = t− n, and where, for all k ≤ age,
w(k, λ, age) =
(age+ 1− k)λ∑age
k′=0(age+ 1− k′)λ
(5)
denotes the weight an agent aged age assigns to the dividend observed k periods earlier,
and w(k, λ, age) ≡ 0 for all k > age. The denominator in (5) is a normalizing constant
that depends only on age and on the parameter that regulates the recency bias, λ. For
λ > 0, more recent observations receive relatively more weight, whereas for λ < 0 the
opposite holds. Finally, ωage ≡ age+1τ+age+1 denotes the weight that agents assign to their
experience beliefs, which increases with age and decreases with the relative importance
agents assign to their prior beliefs, regulated by parameter τ ∈ [0,∞). Since the presence
of prior beliefs has no qualitative implications in our model, unless otherwise stated, we
study the case of τ = 0, i.e. ωage = 1.
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Here are three examples of possible weighting schemes:
9 We solve the model for τ > 0 in Appendix C, and we discuss the quantitative implications of prior
beliefs in our model in Section 6.1.
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Example 2.1 (Linearly Declining Weights, λ = 1). For λ = 1, weights decay linearly as
the time lag increases, i. e., for any 0 ≤ k, k + j ≤ age,
w(k + j, 1, age)− w(k, 1, age) = − j∑age
k′=0(age+ 1− k′)
.
Example 2.2 (Equal Weights, λ = 0). For λ = 0, lifetime observations are equal-
weighted, i. e., for any 0 ≤ k ≤ age, w(k, 0, age) = 1
age+1
.
Example 2.3. For λ→∞, the weight assigned to the most recent observation converges
to 1, and all other weights converge to 0, i. e., for any 0 ≤ k ≤ age, w(k, λ, age)→ 1{k=0}.
Observe that by construction, θnt ∼ N(θ, σ2
∑age
k=0(w(k, λ, age))
2). Hence, θnt does not
necessarily converge to the truth as t→∞; it depends on whether∑agek=0(w(k, λ, age))2 →
0. This in turn depends on how fast the weights for “old” observations decay to zero (i. e.,
how small λ is). When agents have finite lives, convergence will not occur.
We conclude this section by showing a useful property of the weights, which is used in
the characterization of our results.
Lemma 2.1 (Single-Crossing Property). Let age′ < age and λ > 0. Then the function
w(·, λ, age)−w(·, λ, age′) changes signs (from negative to non-negative) exactly once over
{0, ..., age′ + 1}.
2.2 Comparison to Bayesian Learning
To better understand the experience-effect mechanism, we compare the subjective mean
of EBL agents to the posterior mean of agents who update their beliefs using Bayes rule.
We consider two cases: Full Bayesian Learning (FBL), wherein agents use all the available
observations to form their beliefs; and Bayesian Learning from Experience (BLE), where
agents only use data realized during their lifetimes.
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Full Bayesian Learners. To illustrate the comparison of EBL and FBL in a common
sample, just for this analysis, we start the economy at an initial time t = 0, since FBL use
all the available observations since “the beginning of time.” Then, all generations of FBL
agents consider all observations since time 0 to form their belief. We denote the prior of
FBL agents as N(m,σ2m). For simplicity, all generations have the same prior, though the
analysis can easily be extended to heterogeneous Gaussian priors across generations.10
The posterior mean of any generation alive at time t, denoted by θˆt, is given by
θˆt =
σ−2m
σ−2m + σ−2t
m+
σ−2t
σ−2m + σ−2t
(
1
t
t∑
k=0
dk
)
.
The belief of an FBL agent is a convex combination of the prior m and the average of all
observations dk realized since time 0. The key difference to EBL agents is that differences
in personal experiences do not play a role: there is no heterogeneity in beliefs, and all
generations alive in any given period have the same belief about the mean of dividends. In
addition, beliefs of FBL agents are non-stationary, i. e., they depend on the time period.
As t → ∞, the posterior mean converges (almost surely) to the true mean. That is,
with FBL the implications of learning vanish as time goes to infinity. With EBL, this is
not true. Since agents have finite lives and learn from their own experiences, our model
generates learning dynamics even as time diverges.
Bayesian Learners from Experience. For BLE agents, the situation is different. We
assume again that each generation has a prior N(m,σ2m) when they are born. Here, the
posterior mean of generation n at period t = n+ age, denoted by θ˜nt , is given by
θ˜nt =
σ−2m
σ−2m + σ−2(age+ 1)
m+
σ−2(age+ 1)
σ−2m + σ−2(age+ 1)
(
1
age+ 1
t∑
k=n
dk
)
.
The belief of a BLE generation is a convex combination of the prior m and the average
10 The assumption of Gaussianity is also not needed but simplifies the exposition greatly.
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of (only) the lifetime observations dk available to date. The BLE belief coincides with
belief θnt of EBL when there is no recency bias, λ = 0, and the importance assigned to
prior belief is τ = σ
2
σ2m
.
2.3 Equilibrium Definition
We now proceed to define the equilibrium of the economy with EBL agents.
Definition 2.1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium is a demand profile for the risky asset
{xnt }, a demand profile for the riskless asset {ant }, and a price schedule {pt} such that:
1. Given the price schedule, {(ant , xnt ) : t ∈ {n, ..., nq}} solve the generation-n problem.
2. The market clears in all periods: 1 = 1
q
∑t
n=t−q+1 x
n
t for all t ∈ Z.
We focus the analysis on the class of linear equilibria, i. e., equilibria with affine prices:
Definition 2.2 (Linear Equilibrium). A linear equilibrium is an equilibrium wherein
prices are an affine function of dividends. That is, there exists a K ∈ N, α ∈ R, and
βk ∈ R for all k ∈ {0, ..., K} such that
pt = α +
K∑
k=0
βkdt−k. (6)
Benchmark with known mean of dividends. For the sake of benchmarking our
results for EBL agents, we characterize equilibria in an economy where the mean of
dividends, θ, is known by all agents, i. e., Ent [dt] = θ ∀n, t. In this scenario, there are no
disagreements across cohorts, and the demand of any cohort trading at time t is
xnt ∈ arg max
x∈R
E [− exp(−γxst+1)] . (7)
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The solution to this problem is standard and given by
xnt =
E [st+1]
γV [st+1]
(8)
for all n ∈ {t−q+1, ..., t}, and zero otherwise. Since there is no heterogeneity in cohorts’
demands and there is a unit supply of the risky asset, in any equilibrium, xnt = 1 for all
n ∈ {t− q + 1, ..., t}, and zero otherwise. Furthermore, there exists a unique bubble-free
equilibrium with constant prices pt = P ∀t where P = θ−γσ2R−1 .
3 Toy Model
To illustrate the mechanics of the model, we first highlight the main results of the paper
in a simple environment, namely, for q = 2. We will solve the model for any q > 1 in the
next section.
In the toy model with q = 2, there are three cohorts alive at each point in time: a
young cohort, which enters the market for the first time; a middle-aged cohort, which is
participating in the market for the second time; and an old cohort, whose agents simply
consume the payoffs from their lifetime investments. At time t, the problem of generations
n ∈ {t, t−1} is given by (3). It is easy to show that their demands for the risky asset are
xnt =
Ent [st+1]
γV nt [st+1]
.
As one of our first key results in Section 4, we will show that (i) prices depend on
the history of dividends, and (ii) this price predictability is limited to the past dividends
observed (experienced) by the oldest generation trading in the market. In other words,
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we show that K = q− 1 in equation (6). Anticipating this result here for q = 2, we have
pt = α + β0dt + β1dt−1. (9)
The dependence of prices on past dividends is an important feature of our model,
which is shared by many models of extrapolation and learning. A distinct feature of our
model is that this dependence is intrinsically linked to the demographic structure of the
economy. It matters which generations are participating in the market and how much.
The cross-sectional differences in lifetime experiences, and the resulting cross-sectional
differences in beliefs, determine cohorts’ trading behavior. Given the functional form for
prices, we can re-write the demands of both cohorts that are actively trading as
xtt =
α + (1 + β0)E
t
t [dt+1] + β1dt − ptR
γ (1 + β0)
2 σ2
xt−1t =
α + (1 + β0)E
t−1
t [dt+1] + β1dt − ptR
γ (1 + β0)
2 σ2
.
The difference between cohorts’ demand arises from their different beliefs about future
dividends, Ett [dt+1] and E
t−1
t [dt+1], given by
Ett [dt+1] = dt,
Et−1t [dt+1] =
(
2λ
1 + 2λ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
w(0,λ,1)
dt +
(
1
1 + 2λ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
w(1,λ,1)
dt−1.
These formulas illustrate the mechanics of EBL and the cause of heterogeneity among
agents. In the simplified setting, the younger generation has only experienced the divi-
dend dt and expects the dividends to be identical in the next period. The older generation,
having more experience, incorporates the previous dividend in their weighing scheme. An
implication of these formulas is that the younger generations react more optimistically
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than older generations to positive changes in recent dividends, and more pessimistically
to negative changes. In Section 4.2, we show that this result continues to hold in the
general model. We also see that belief heterogeneity is increasing in the change in divi-
dends, |dt − dt−1|, and decreasing in the recency bias, λ. In Section 4.3, we exploit this
observation to link movements in the volume of trade to belief disagreements.
We now impose the market clearing condition, 1
2
(xtt + x
t−1
t ) = 1, to derive the equi-
librium price given these demands. We use the method of undetermined coefficients to
solve for {α, β0, β1}. Setting the constants and the terms that multiply dt and dt−1 to
zero, we obtain a system of equations whose solution determines the price constant and
the loadings of present and past dividends on prices,
α =− γ(1 + β0)
2σ2
R− 1 , (10)
β0 =
2R2
(R− 1)
(
1 + 2R− 2λ
1+2λ
) − 1, (11)
β1 =
R
(
1− 2λ
1+2λ
)
(R− 1)
(
1 + 2R− 2λ
1+2λ
) . (12)
These solutions illustrate how the price loadings on past dividends depend on the de-
mographics of the economy and on the magnitude of the recency bias. It is easy to derive
the unconditional price volatility, which is σ(pt) = (β
2
0+β
2
1)
1
2σ, and price auto-correlation,
which is ρ(pt, pt+j) = β0β1 for j = 1 and ρ(pt, pt+j) = 0 for j > 1. The variance of prices
is increasing in the recency bias λ while the price auto-correlation is decreasing in the re-
cency bias. The intuition is straightforward: as the recency bias increases, prices become
more responsive to the most recent dividend, ∂β0
∂λ
> 0, increasing price volatility, and less
responsive to past dividends, ∂β1
∂λ
< 0, decreasing price autocorrelation. In Section 5, we
present an enriched version of the model with demographic shocks and discuss how these
price loadings vary with the demographic structure of the economy.
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4 General Model
We now return to the general case (i. e., allow for any q > 1) and characterize the
portfolio choices and resulting demands for the risky asset of the different cohorts when
agents exhibit EBL. We impose affine prices, then use market clearing to verify the affine
prices guess, and fully characterize demands and prices. Deriving the results in the
general model allows us to discuss in more detail the relation between demographics,
cross-sectional asset holdings, and market dynamics. We obtain testable predictions,
which we bring to the data in Section 6.
4.1 Characterization of Equilibrium Demands and Prices
For any s, t ∈ Z, let ds:t = (ds, ..., dt) denote the history of dividends from time s up to
time t. For simplicity and WLOG, we assume that the initial wealth of all generations
is zero, i.e., W nn = 0 for all n ∈ Z. At time t ∈ {n, ..., nq}, an agent of generation n
determines her demand for the risky asset maximizing Ent [− exp (−γxst+1)], as in (3).
The model set-up allows us to derive a standard expression for risky-asset demand:
Proposition 4.1. Suppose pt = α+
∑K
k=0 βkdt−k with β0 6= −1. Then, for any generation
n ∈ Z trading in period t ∈ {n, ..., nq}, demands for the risky asset are given by
xnt =
Ent [st+1]
γV [st+1]
=
Ent [st+1]
γ(1 + β0)2σ2
. (13)
The expression for the risky-asset demands in equation (13) allows us to derive equi-
librium prices. Note that equation (13) implies that demands at time t are affine in
dt−K:t. It is easy to see, then, that beliefs about future dividends are linear functions of
the dividends observed by each generation participating in the market, and thus prices
depend on the history of dividends observed by the oldest generation in the market:
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Proposition 4.2. The price in any linear equilibrium is affine in the history of dividends
observed by the oldest generation participating in the market, i.e., for any t ∈ Z
pt = α +
q−1∑
k=0
βkdt−k, with (14)
α = − 1(
1−∑q−1j=0 wjRj+1)2
γσ2
R− 1 (15)
βk =
∑q−1−k
j=0
wk+j
Rj+1
1−∑q−1j=0 wjRj+1 k ∈ {0, ..., q − 1} (16)
where wk ≡ 1q
∑q−1
age=0w (k, λ, age).
Proposition 4.2 establishes a novel link between the factors influencing asset prices and
demographic composition. For each k = {0, 1, ..., q − 1}, one can interpret wk as the
average weight placed on the dividend observed at time t− k by all generations trading
at time t. As the formula also reveals, the relative magnitudes of the weights on past
dividends, βk, depend on the number of cohorts in the market, q, on the fraction of each
cohort in the market, 1
q
, and on the extent of agents’ recency bias, λ.11
The main idea of the proposition is as follows. In a linear equilibrium, demands at
time t are affine in dividends dt−K:t. However, from these dividends, only dt−q+1:t matter
for forming beliefs; the dividends dt−K:t−q only enter through the definition of linear
equilibrium. The proof shows that, under market clearing, the coefficients accompanying
older dividends dt−K:t−q are zero. The proposition also implies that we can apply the same
restriction to demands and conclude that demands at time t only depend on dt−q+1:t.
Note that ∂βk
∂R
< 0 and ∂α
∂R
> 0 for any λ. That is, if the interest rate is higher, the
11 In our baseline model, cohorts are equally weighted. We remove this assumption in Section 5, where
we analyze demographic shocks. In those examples, there is no link between the number of cohorts and
the fraction of each cohort in the market.
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equilibrium price of the risky asset responds less strongly to past dividends. Furthermore,
higher risk aversion γ decreases the equilibrium price by lowering α.
The following proposition establishes that, as long as agents exhibit any positive re-
cency bias (i. e., λ > 0), the sensitivity of prices to past dividends is stronger the more
recent the dividend realization.
Proposition 4.3. For λ > 0, more recent dividends affect prices more than less recent
dividends, i. e., 0 < βq−1 < .... < β1 < β0.
This result reflects the fact that the dividends at time t are observed by all generations
whereas past dividends are only observed by older generations. At the same time, the
extent to which prices depend on the most recent dividends varies with the level recency
bias, as shown in the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.1. The effect of the most recent dividend realization on prices, β0, is increasing
in λ, with lim
λ→∞
β0(λ) = 1/(R− 1) and lim
λ→∞
βk(λ) = 0 for k > 0.
As λ→∞, the average weights wk (defined in Proposition 4.2) converge to 1{k=0} for
all k = {0, 1, ..., K}. Therefore, βk → 0 for all k > 0 and β0 → 1R−1 . In other words, under
extreme recency bias (λ → ∞), only the current dividend affects prices in equilibrium,
while the weights on all past dividends vanish.
In Section 5, we show that the dependence of prices on more recent dividends is also
increasing in the fraction of young agents in the market; that is, β0 increases as the
relative measure of the youngest cohort in the market increases.
These results on price sensitivity to past dividends, as well as the dampening effect of
recency bias on cross-sectional heterogeneity, produce a range of asset pricing implica-
tions, from known puzzles such as the predictability of stock returns and excess volatility
to new predictions about the link between asset prices and demographcis. We will derive
and test these empirical implications in Section 6.
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4.2 Cross-Section of Asset Holdings
Experience-based learning has distinctive implications for the cross-section of asset hold-
ings. We show that positive shocks (booms) induce a larger representation of younger
investors in the market, while negative shocks (crashes) have the opposite effect. To
illustrate this, we first show that younger investors react more optimistically than older
ones to positive changes in recent dividends, and more pessimistically to negative ones.
Proposition 4.4. For any t ∈ Z and any generations n ≤ m trading at t, there is a
threshold time-lag k0 ≤ t−m− 1 such that for dividends that date back up to k0 periods,
the risky-asset demand of the younger generation (born at m) responds more strongly to
changes than the demand of the older generation (born at n), while for dividends that
date back more than k0 periods the opposite holds. That is,
1.
∂xmt
∂dt−k
≥ ∂xnt
∂dt−k
for 0 ≤ k ≤ k0 and
2.
∂xmt
∂dt−k
≤ ∂xnt
∂dt−k
for k0 < k ≤ q − 1.
Proposition 4.4 establishes that, for any two cohorts of investors, there is a threshold
time-lag up to which past dividends are weighted more by the younger generation, and
beyond which past dividend realization are weighted more by the older generation.
In what follows, we extend this insight into predictions about relative stock-market
positions. We show that, as a result of the stronger impact of more recent shocks on the
beliefs (and thus, demands) of younger generations, the relative positions of the young
and the old in the market fluctuate. Let us denote the difference between generations n
and n + k in terms of their investment in the risky asset, as ξ(n, k, t) ≡ xnt − xn+kt . By
Proposition 4.1, and some simple algebra, it follows that:
ξ(n, k, t) =
Ent [θ]− En+kt [θ]
γ(1 + β0)σ2
∀k = {0, ..., t− n}, n = {t− q + 1, ..., t} (17)
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This formulation illustrates that the discrepancy between the positions of different gener-
ations is entirely explained by the discrepancy in beliefs. For instance, if for some a > 0,
dn:t ≈ dn+a:t+a, then ξ(n+ a, k, t+ a) ≈ ξ(n, k, t).12
The next result shows that, among generations born and growing up in “boom times,”
understood as periods of increasing dividends, the younger generations have a relatively
higher demand for the risky asset than the older generations. The reverse holds for
“depression babies,” i. e., generations born during times of contraction. In times of de-
pression, the younger generations exhibit a particularly low willingness to invest in the
risky asset, relative to older generations born during those times.
Proposition 4.5. Suppose λ > 0. Consider two points in time t0 ≤ t1 such that dividends
are non-decreasing from t0 up to t1. Then for any two generations n ≤ n+k born between
t0 and t1, the demand of the older generation for the risky asset (x
n
t ) is lower than the
demand of the younger generation (xn+kt ) at any point n ≤ t ≤ t1, i.e., ξ(n, k, t) ≤ 0. On
the other hand, if dividends are non-increasing, then ξ(n, k, t) ≥ 0.
The proposition illustrates that, while boom times tend to make all cohorts growing up
in such times more optimistic, the effect is particularly strong for the younger generations.
This induces them to be overrepresented in the market for the risky asset. The opposite
holds during times of downturn.
4.3 Trade Volume
We now study how learning and disagreements affect the volume of trade observed in the
market. We consider the following definition of the total volume of trade in the economy:
12 This last claim follows since the inter-temporal change in discrepancies between sets of generations
of the same age, ξ(n+ a, k, t+ a)− ξ(n, k, t) for a > 0, is given by (∑t−n−kj=0 {w(j, λ, t− n)− w(j, λ, t−
n− k)}(dt+a−j − dt−j) +
∑t−n
j=t−n−k+1 w(j, λ, t− n)(dt+a−j − dt−j))/(γ(1 + β0)σ2).
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TVt ≡
(
1
q
t∑
n=t−q
(
xnt − xnt−1
)2) 12
(18)
with xtt−1 = 0. That is, trade volume is the square root of the weighted sum (squared) of
the change in positions of all agents in the economy. Using this definition, we characterize
the link between trade volume and belief heterogeneity.
Proposition 4.6. The trade volume defined in (18) can be expressed as
TVt =
χ2
q
t∑
n=t−q
((
θnt − θnt−1
)− 1
q
t∑
n˜=t−q
(
θn˜t − θn˜t−1
))2
+
1
q
(xtt)
2 +
1
q
(xt−qt−1)
2
 12 , (19)
where χ = 1
γσ2(1+β0)
, θtt−1 = θ
t−q
t = 0.
Expression (19) illustrates that the presence of EBL induces trade through changes
in beliefs, which in our framework are driven by shocks to dividends. More specifically,
when the change in a cohort’s beliefs is different from the average change in beliefs, trade
volume increases. That is, trade volume increases in the dispersion of changes in beliefs.
To understand the drivers of trade volume, we need to understand not only the demands
of agents that enter and exit the market, but, most importantly, how beliefs across
cohorts change in response to a given shock. From our previous analysis, it follows
that an increase (decrease) in dividends induces trade when it makes young agents more
optimistic (pessimistic) than old agents. This mechanism is solely due to the presence of
EBL, since it is essential that each generation reacts differently to the same dividend.
We formalize this insight in the following thought experiment capturing the reaction
to a dividend shock that occurs after a long period of stability.
Thought Experiment. Suppose that, for t − t0 > q, dt0 = dt0+1 = ... = dt−1 = d¯
and that dt 6= d¯. Hence, all generations alive at time t− 2 and t− 1 have only observed
a constant stream of dividends d¯ over their lifetimes so far. Therefore, Ent−2 [dt−1] =
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Ent−1 [dt] = d¯ for all n ∈ {t − 1 − q, ..., t − 1} and thus trade volume in t − 1 is simply
given by the demand of the youngest (entering) and the oldest (exiting) agents.
What happens at time t, when a dividend dt 6= d¯ is observed? For each generation n
trading at time t and at time t − 1, i. e., for n = {t − q + 1, .., t − 1}, beliefs are given
by Ent [dt+1] = w(0, λ, t − n)(dt − d¯) + d¯ and Ent−1 [dt] = w(0, λ, t − 1− n)(dt−1 − d¯) + d¯,
which implies the following change in cohort n’s beliefs: Ent [dt+1]−Ent−1 [dt] = w(0, λ, t−
n)(dt − d¯). Trade volume in t is therefore:
TVt =
χ2 (dt − d¯)2
q
t−1∑
n=t−q+1
(
w(0, λ, t− n)− 1
q
t−1∑
n˜=t−q+1
w(0, λ, t− n˜)
)2
+
1
q
(xtt)
2 +
1
q
(xt−qt−1)
2
 12 .
(20)
This thought experiment pins down two aspects of the link between the volatility in
beliefs and trade volume: First, the trade volume increases proportionally to the change
in dividends, |dt − d¯|, independently of whether the change is positive or negative, and
also proportionally to a function that reflects the dispersion of the weights agents assign
to the most recent observation in their belief formation process. Second, the increase in
trade volume generated by a given change in dividends depends on the level of recency
bias of the economy, which is captured by λ. For example, as λ → ∞, the dispersion
in weights decreases as w(0, λ, age) → 1 for all age ∈ {0, ..., q − 1}. Thus, our results
suggest that higher recency bias, λ, should generate lower trade volume responses for a
given shock to dividends, and vice versa.
5 Market Participation
The results derived so far illustrate a key feature of experience-based learning: The
demographic structure of an economy, and in particular the cross-sectional composition of
investors, affect equilibrium prices, demand, and trade volume in a predictable direction.
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In this section, we explore the link between market demographics and financial market
outcomes by considering an unexpected increase in the fraction of young market partici-
pants, e. g., due to a baby boom or a generation-specific event drawing a certain generation
into the stock market.13 The goal of this exercise is to understand how a larger fraction
of young market participants affects market dynamics.
For ease of illustration, we focus again on our q = 2 economy. We denote the mass of
young agents at any time t by yt, and the total mass of agents at t by mt = yt + yt−1.
We consider a one-time unexpected (exogenous) shock to the mass of young agents in the
market at time τ .14 For all t < τ and t > τ + 1, instead, yt = y and thus mt = 2y = m.
We know from our previous results that when the market has equal-sized cohorts, prices
are given by pt = α+β0dt+β1dt−1, with {α, β0, β1} given by (10)-(12). Here, prices follow
this path for t > τ +1 and, since the shock at time τ is unexpected, for t < τ as well. For
these time periods, the market is as described in Section 3. We are left to characterize
demands and prices for τ and τ + 1, when the larger young generation enters the market
and when this generation becomes old, respectively. We make the following guesses:
pτ = aτ + b0,τdτ + b1,τdτ−1, (21)
pτ+1 = aτ+1 + b0,τ+1dτ+1 + b1,τ+1dτ . (22)
We solve the problem by backwards induction. Note that the form of agents’ demands
remains unchanged. By imposing market clearing in τ + 1, with mass y of young agents
13 We have also analyzed the implications of a growing market population, as opposed to a one-time
market demographic shock. In Online Appendix D, we show that population growth generates a positive
trend in prices, which is independent of experience effects: The growing mass of agents increases the
demand for the risky asset, and hence prices adjust to clear markets, since risky-asset supply is assumed
to be constant. While the positive trend is independent of experience effects, experience-based learning
does affect the path of the prices fluctuating around this trend. In particular, we find that the relative
reliance of prices on the most recent dividend is increasing in the population growth rate.
14 In reality, the participation of young agents in the market could also be determined endogenously
(e. g., by entry costs). While the forces described in this section would still be present in such scenario,
other forces may be at play as well. The study of these interactions is out of the scope of this paper.
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and yτ of old agents, and using the method of undetermined coefficients we obtain
aτ+1 = α
1
R
[
1 +
R− 1
mτ
]
,
b0,τ+1 = β0
[
1 +
1
R
(
mτ − yτ
mτ
+
yτ
mτ
ω − y
m
(1 + ω)
)]
+
1
R
(
mτ − yτ
mτ
+
yτ
mτ
ω − y
m
(1 + ω)
)
,
b1,τ+1 = β1
yτ
mτ
m
y
,
where ω ≡ 2λ
1+2λ
and mτ = y + yτ . Note that for yτ = y, the coefficients are as in the
baseline model (10)-(12). The above expressions show that the total mass of agents mτ
only affects the price constant, while the price loadings depend on the fraction of young
agents in the market, yτ/mτ . We impose market clearing in τ , with mass yτ of young
agents and y of old agents. Using the method of undetermined coefficients, we obtain
aτ =
1
R
[
aτ+1 − γ (1 + b0,τ+1)
2 σ2
mτ
]
,
b0,τ =
1
R
(1 + b0,τ+1)
(
yτ
mτ
+
mτ − yτ
mτ
ω
)
+
1
R2
(1 + β0)
yτ
mτ
(1− ω) ,
b1,τ =
1
R
(1 + b0,τ+1)
mτ − yτ
mτ
(1− ω) .
Figure 2 shows how the reliance of prices on past dividends changes with the fraction
of young agents in the market at time τ . We see that as the fraction of young people in
the market increases (yτ > 0.5), the more current dividends matter more relative to past
dividends for the determination of prices; i.e., bτ0 increases while b
τ
1 decreases. Consistent
with this, when the τ -generation becomes old, prices depend less on contemporaneous
dividends and more on past dividends; i.e., bτ+10 decreases while b
τ+1
1 increases. Finally, an
increase in the overall market population, and thus demand for the risky asset, generates
a level increase in prices captured an increase in the price constant both at τ and τ+1. All
predictions are reversed when the fraction of young agents in the market decreases (yτ <
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(a) Price Loading on dt (b) Price Loading on dt−1
Figure 2: Demographic Shocks and Price Coefficients.
Notes. This figure plots coefficients {β0, b0,τ , b0,τ+1} in Panel (a) and {β1, b1,τ , b1,τ+1} in
Panel (b) as a function of the demographic shock yτ . The results are for y = 0.5, λ = 3,
and R = 1.05.
0.5). These results are consistent with Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2016),
who show both theoretically and empirically that the sensitivity of the price-dividend
ratio to macro-shocks increases with the relative fraction of young market participants.
6 Empirical Implications
In this section, we analyze the empirical implications of our model. The analysis consists
of two approaches. First, we turn to asset-pricing features established in prior empirical
literature: the predictability of stocks returns, the predictability of the dividend-price
ratio, and the excess volatility puzzle. We show that the experience-based learning model
is able to quantitatively match these empirical findings, and that it generates refined
predictions about their relation with the demographic composition of investors. Second,
we test the novel predictions generated by our model regarding the implications of the
demographic composition on the predictability of the price-dividend ratio, trade volume,
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and the cross-section of asset holdings. We show that these predictions are in line with
evidence from micro-level data in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
6.1 Quantitative Implications for Asset-Pricing Moments
We first show that experience-based learning can explain several key asset-pricing puzzles.
As the CARA-Normal framework is not well suited for a thorough calibration exercise,
we follow the approach of Campbell and Kyle (1993) and Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and
Shleifer (2015), among others, to compute the moments of interest generated by our model
and contrast them with the data. As in these papers, we define quantities in terms of
differences rather than ratios, since variables in our model proxy for the log of prices and
dividends in the data. Thus, in this section, capital letters P and D are used to denote
prices and dividends, respectively, while small letters denote their logs, p = log(P ) and
d = log(D). For example, instead of stock returns we measure price changes ∆p, and
instead of the price-dividend ratio P/D we study the difference p− d.
A distinguishing feature of our model is that it establishes a link between the age
profile of agents participating in the stock market and the factors that determine prices.
Another feature of our model is the small number of parameters to be set for generating
numerical results.15 Following Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (2015), we choose
the following parameter values for our numerical solutions: the gross risk-free interest rate
is R = 1.05, the volatility of dividends is σ = 0.25, and the coefficient of risk-aversion is
γ = 2. We show our estimates for λ ∈ {1, 3} and for q ∈ {2, 40}.
Predictability of Excess Returns. A prominent stylized fact about stock-market
returns, established by Campbell and Shiller (1988), is that the dividend-price ratio
15 The link between demographics and price features is also studied in (Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and
Lochstoer 2016).
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predicts future returns with a positive sign. Experience-based learning rationalizes such
predictability and, at the same time, limits it to those dividend realizations experienced
by the oldest cohort participating in the market.
In order to relate the predictability generated in our model to the existing empirical
evidence, and to show how it varies with the demographic composition of investors, we
calculate the following measure of co-movement between the analogues of the dividend-
price ratio and returns, namely, between dividend-price differences dt − pt and price
changes pt+z − pt over return horizon z:
BRt (z ) ≡
Cov(dt − pt , pt+z − pt)
Var(dt − pt) . (23)
We compute BRt (z ) using equation (14) from Proposition 4.2.
We first calculate BRt (z ) for different horizons z. Panel (a) of Figure 3 plots B
R
t (z ) for
z ranging from 1 to 42, and different levels of recency bias, λ ∈ {1, 3}, in an economy with
q = 40. Given the number of cohorts, the obtained co-movements can be interpreted as
annual; that is, z = 1 can be interpreted as a one year horizon. As the panel shows, the
experience-based learning model generates a positive (and strong) relation between the
dividend price ratio and returns, which increases with the return horizon. These predicted
patterns are consistent with the empirical findings described in Cochrane (2011). We note
that the predictability of excess returns under EBL is an equilibrium phenomenon that
stems solely from our learning mechanism and not from, say, a built-in dependence on
dividends or past returns. Similar to prior theoretical approaches, such as the over-
extrapolation model of Barberis et al. (2015) and Barberis et al. (2016), our explanation
relies on agents’ overweighting recent realizations.
Our model has the additional implication that different demographic structures gen-
erate different β’s, which directly determine the level of predictability (or extrapolation)
of stock returns. We show this by studying how the coefficient BRt (1) varies with the
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(a) BRt (z) with q = 40 (b) B
R
t (1) with q = 2 (c) B
R
t−1(1) with q = 2
Figure 3: Predictive Power of Dt − Pt for Pt+z − Pt.
Notes. This figure plots the coefficient BRt for two levels of recency bias, λ ∈ {1, 3}. Panel
(a) shows how BRt (z) varies with the return horizon z, for q = 35. Panel (b) shows how
BRt (1) varies with the fraction yt of young agents in the market at time t, and panel (c)
with the fraction yt+1 of young agents in the market at time t+1, in both cases for q = 2.
The results are calculated for y = 0.5 and R = 1.05.
fraction of young market participants. Here, we use the results from Section 5 on the
effect of a one-time unexpected shock to the mass of young agents, so we focus on an
economy with q = 2. Note that with q = 2 the co-movements cannot be interpreted as
annual; in particular, z = 1 captures approximately a 15-20 year horizon. We assume
that the fraction of young agents equals y at all times before and after t, but there is
a one-time exogenous shock in t, resulting in yt 6= y. The resulting variation in next
period’s return predictability (based on this period’s dividend-price ratio), BRt (1), and
in the current period’s return predictability (based on last period’s dividend-price ratio),
BRt−1(1), are shown in panels (b) and (c) of Figure 3. For both graphs we fix y at 0.5,
and we plot yt over a range [0, 1].
As the plots show, the predictability of next period’s return, BRt (1), decreases in the
number of young market participants (panel b), while the predictability of this period’s
return, BRt−1(1), increases in their number (panel c). The key channel is the differential
impact on the variance of the dividend-price ratio. In both cases the covariance between
future returns and the dividend-price ratio increases in the fraction of young agents;
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but only the variance of the dividend-price ratio at time t increases such that it off-sets
the increase in covariance. Thus, return predictability is affected by the demographic
composition of market participants, and the effect is sensitive to the timing of the partic-
ipation shock. With a larger generation of market participants coming in at t, the return
experienced in that period is more predictable.
Predictability of Price-Dividend Ratio. In addition to the predictability of re-
turns, we can also compute the predictability of the price-dividend ratio implied by the
model. That is, we relate past P/D ratios to future P/D realizations, and analyze the
persistence of the price-dividend ratio. In particular, we study how this predictability of
P/D ratios varies with the investment horizon and with the fraction of young people in
the market. Our measure of predictability is constructed as follows:
BPDt (z) =
cov (pt+z − dt+z, pt − dt)
var (pt − dt) (24)
We first calculate how BPDt varies with the horizon z. Panel (a) of Figure 4 displays how
BPDt varies for different horizons z, and for different levels of recency bias, λ ∈ {1, 3}, in an
economy with q = 40. The large q allows us to relate the obtained correlations to annual
correlations. As in the data, we obtain that the P/D is highly autocorrelated at short
lags, with the autocorrelation being zero at longer horizons. From Panel (b) we see that
as we reduce the number of cohorts in the market (or their horizon), autocorrelations are
lower. Furthermore, BPDt decreases in the extent of recency bias present in the population
for all q.
We then turn to the demographic structure, using again the results from Section 5.
As shown in panel (b) of Figure 4, BPDt increases with the fraction of young agents in
the market at time t, and the effect is weaker under higher recency bias. Furthermore,
BPDt increases with the number of cohorts in the market. A direct implication is that
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(a) BDPt (z) with q = 40 (b) B
DP
t (1) with q = 2
Figure 4: pt − dt autocorrelation.
Notes. This figure plots the coefficient BPDt for two levels of recency bias, λ ∈ {1, 3}.
Panel (a) shows how BPDt (z) varies with the investment horizon z for q = 40. Panel (b)
shows how BPDt (1) varies with the fraction yt of young agents in the market at time t for
q = 2. The results are calculated for y = 0.5 and R = 1.05.
the dividend-price ratio is positively correlated only with lagged realizations where the
number of periods lagged is below the number of cohorts in the market.
Price Dynamics. A third set of asset pricing implications are related to the dynamics
of prices, and in particular the excess volatility puzzle. As is standard in the literature,
we analyze the volatility of the log price growth and of the log price-dividend ratio, and
the volatility of log prices relative to that of log dividends, both in the model and in the
data. To do so, we use historical price and dividend data from Robert Shiller’s website,
where all log series are de-trended. Our stylized model generates ample volatility relative
to our benchmark economy and to the data. The main reason being that agents’ beliefs
are extremely volatile when they do not put any weight on their prior belief (τ = 0 in
(4)), which would operate as an anchor. To highlight the quantitative effects of prior
beliefs, we compute the model generated volatilities when we vary the importance that
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Table 1: Excess Volatility
agents assign to their prior beliefs.16 Table 1 presents our results for an economy with
λ = 1, q = 40, and for different levels of prior relevance, captured by τ .
We see that experience-based learning generates ample excess volatility in prices, re-
turns, and price-dividend ratios. This can be seen by comparing the data with the model
with no prior beliefs (τ = 0). However, if we allow agents to have prior beliefs, the model
is able to generate moments more in line with the data. From these findings, we conclude
that experience-based learning has the ability to generate volatility in line with the data.
6.2 Demographics on Price-Dividend Predictability
The predictability results in the previous subsection are consistent with the findings of
Cassella and Gulen (2015), who find a positive relation between their market-wide mea-
sure of return extrapolation and the relative participation of young versus old investors
in the stock market. Our model of experience-based learning goes beyond a rational-
ization of the evidence on agents extrapolating from past dividends (cf. also Greenwood
and Shleifer (2014)). It puts structure on the extent of such extrapolation exhibited by
different market participants and links it to market demographics. We now bring this
prediction to the data and show that is aligned with empirical observations.
We want to test whether the predictive power of the lagged P/D ratios for the current
16 The solution to the model with prior beliefs is described in detail in Appendix C.
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one depends on the relative representation of younger versus older generations in the
market in the manner predicted by the model. Experience-based learning predicts that
the correlation between future and current lags is higher when the current share of young
market participants is large. Moreover, the model generates the heuristic that young
people put little weight on observations of the “distant” past (cf. Proposition 4.4).
In order to test these predictions, we regress the log of the P/D ratio onto lags of itself
interacted with a dummy variable that indicates a larger presence of young people in the
market. In order to model the dynamics of the P/D process, we depart from the standard
linear AR models and postulate a Markov-Switching Regime (MSR) model, which allows
us to capture richer, non-linear dynamics in a tractable way.17 The regression model is
thus given by
pt+1 − dt+1 = µ(St+1) +
3∑
j=1
(pt+1−j − dt+1−j)(βj + δj × Yt+1) + σt+1, (25)
where pt and dt denote the log of dividends and prices at time t, respectively, St+1 ∈ {0, 1}
is an unobserved state that evolves according to a Markov transition kernel Q; Yt is a
dummy variable that takes value 1 if the share of young generations participating in the
market at time t is large relative to the participation of older generations, and 0 otherwise;
and we assume t+1 ∼ N(0, 1). The parameters, ({µ(s)}s∈{0,1}, σ,Q, {βj, δj}3j=1), are
jointly estimated using maximum likelihood (see, e. g., Hamilton (1994) for details).
We consider two dummies for the relative representation of younger generations in the
market. First, we compute the ratio of investors who are less than 50 years old in the
total population, and construct an indicator that equals 1 if their share is bigger than
50% (or, for robustness, bigger than 55% or 60%). Second, we calculate young investors’
share of liquid wealth, and use an indicator that equals 1 if their liquid-wealth share is
above its sample average (or, for robustness above 90% or 110% of the sample average).
17 For a more thorough discussion of MSR see Hamilton (1989).
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Table 2: Markov-Switching Regime (MSR) Model
Estimation results for model specification (25), where pt − dt is the log of the price-to-
dividend ratio, and regressed onto lags of itself interacted with a demographic dummy
variable. Yt is the fraction of young people, which we define as an indicator equal to 1
when the fraction of investors under 50 is larger than 0.5 (in column 1), or as an indicator
equal to 1 when the fraction of wealth of investors below 50 is larger than their 1960-2013
sample average (in column 2).The demographic data including age and wealth (liquid
assets) of stock market participants is from the SCF, stock data from Robert Shiller’s
website.
Dependent variable: pt − dt
(1) (2)
Yt age-based Yt age/wealth based
δ1 0.701** 0.475*
(0.154) (0.252)
δ2 -0.013 -0.115
(0.146) (0.366)
δ3 -0.745** -0.329
(0.115) (0.232)
β1 0.377** 0.622**
(0.120) (0.159)
β2 -0.216** -0.074
(0.088) (0.136)
β3 0.714** 0.249**
(0.093) (0.099)
µ(S1) 5.089** 5.741**
(1.554) (1.812)
µ(S2) 19.450** 18.350**
(3.070) (4.768)
σ 3.812 4.343
(0.388) (0.600)
Q11 0.956 0.978
(0.026) (0.017)
Q21 0.365 0.206
(0.204) (0.154)
N 51 51
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.
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Details on the variable construction and robustness checks are in Online-Appendix E.
The theoretical prediction of our model is that the correlation between future and
current lags should be higher when the current share of young market participants is
large. This translates into the hypothesis that δ1 > 0 in the estimation model in (25).
The estimated values are reported in Table 2. In column (1), we use the fraction of
young people in the population, and in column (2) the fraction of their wealth to proxy for
the relative representation of younger people in the market. In both cases, the estimates
provide evidence in favor of the model hypothesis. We estimate a positive δ1 coefficient,
which is either significant at the 5% or at the 10% level. Moreover, considering all three
coefficients (δi)
3
i=1 jointly, a roughly “decreasing” pattern emerges: δ1 is typically positive,
δ2 is typically non-significant, and δ3 is negative or insignificantly negative, consistent with
the heuristics that young people put little weight on observations of the “distant” past.
Thus, in periods when their share is relatively large, the correlation between future and
distant past values is weakened.
6.3 Cross-Section of Asset Holdings and Trade Volume
We now turn to the novel empirical predictions of the experience-based learning model
about the cross-section of equity holdings and stock turnover. We investigate two sets of
predictions that are directly testable and jointly hard to generate by alternative models.
The first prediction is that cross-sectional differences in the demand for risky securities
reflect cross-sectional differences in lifetime experiences of risky payoffs. That is, cohorts
with more positive lifetime experiences are predicted to invest more in the risky asset
than cohorts with less positive experiences (Proposition 4.1). We test this both in terms
of stock-market participation (extensive margin) and in terms of the amount of liquid
assets invested in the stock market (intensive margin). The second prediction is that
changes in the cross-section of experience-based beliefs generate trade (Proposition 4.6).
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To test these model predictions, we combine historical stock returns data from Robert
Shiller’s website with SCF data on stock holdings and CRSP data on stock turnover.
The key explanatory variable is a measure of cohorts’ lifetime experiences of risky-asset
payoffs. Theoretically, dividends in the Lucas-tree economy capture the performance of
the risky asset, or the stock market. Empirically dividends payments do not necessarily
reflect how well firms are doing. For example, firms have incentives to smooth dividends,
and also to retain earnings rather than distribute them. In other words, dividends in
our model do not translate one-to-one to the dividend payments recorded in CRSP. We
therefore use an array of empirical measures to capture the performance of the risky
asset in our model: (1) annual stock market returns, (2) real dividends, (3) real earnings,
and (4) U.S. GDP. We obtain the first three series from Robert Shiller’s website, and
the nominal GDP data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (for 1929-2016) and
Historical Statistics of the United States Millennial Edition Online (for 1871-1928). We
convert nominal GDP into real GDP using Shiller’s consumer price index variable.
Dividends in our model are best interpreted as the performance of the risky asset at
medium frequencies. Therefore, we use the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) band-pass
filter and remove stochastic cycles at frequencies lower than 2 years and higher than 8
years,18 for all non-stationary series (dividend, earnings, and GDP).
In order to construct the experienced returns, dividends, earnings, and GDP of different
generations over the course of their lives, we apply the formula from equation (5). We
calculate generation-specific weighted averages, employing both linearly declining weights
(λ = 1), and a steeper weighting function (λ = 3), corresponding to the range of empirical
estimates in Malmendier and Nagel (2011).
Stock market participation. We test the first prediction relating the differences in
18 These are the default frequencies for the CF-filter. We also remove a linear trend of the series before
applying the filter and, in addition, work with the natural logarithm of earnings and GDP to remove
non-linearities in these series. In unreported analyses, we also use the natural logarithm of dividends
and obtain very similar results.
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lifetime experiences between older and younger cohorts (i. e., those above 60 and those
below 40 years of age) to the differences in their stock-market investment. Our source
of household-level micro data is the cross-sectional data on asset holdings and various
household background characteristics in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). We use
all waves of the modern, triannual SCF, available from the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System since 1983. We follow the variable construction of Malmendier
and Nagel (2011) and extend their analysis to the most recently released data. In addi-
tion, we employ some waves of the precursor survey, available from the Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan since 1947.
We use all survey waves that include age and stock-market participation.19
For the extensive margin of stock holdings, we construct an indicator of stock-market
participation. It equals 1 when a household holds more than zero dollars worth of stocks.
We define stock holdings as the sum of directly held stocks (including stock held through
investment clubs) and the equity portion of mutual fund holdings, including stocks held
in retirement accounts (e.g., IRA, Keogh, and 401(k) plans).20
For the intensive margin of stock holdings, we calculate the fraction of liquid assets
invested in stocks as the share of directly held stocks plus the equity share of mutual
funds, using all surveys from 1960-2013 other than 1971. Liquid assets are defined as the
sum of stock holdings, bonds, cash, and short-term instruments (checking and savings
accounts, money market mutual funds, certificates of deposit). In these analyses of the
intensive margin, we drop all households that have no money in stocks.
For both the young and old age group, we calculate their experience and their stock-
market investment as a weighted average across cohorts, with the weight variable provided
19 Those are 1960, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1977.
20 For 1983 and 1986, we need to impute the stock component of retirement assets from the type of
the account or the institution at which they are held and allocation information from 1989. From 1989
to 2004, the SCF offers only coarse information on retirement assets (e. g., mostly stocks, mostly interest
bearing, or split), and we follow a refined version of the Federal Reserve Board’s conventions in assigning
portfolio shares. See Malmendier and Nagel (2011) for more details.
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in the SCF. The weighted estimates are representative of the U.S. population.21
We present the results graphically. We plot the relation between stock holdings (ex-
tensive and intensive margin) and experienced returns (Figure 5), dividends (Figure 6),
earnings (Figure 7), and GDP (Figure 8). Graphs 5.(a) and 5.(c) update the evidence on
the extensive margin and returns presented in Malmendier and Nagel (2011).)
The results for all four performance measures and both for the extensive and intensive
margin are in line with the predictions of our model. Starting from experienced returns
with λ = 1 in panel (a) of Figure 5, we see that the older age-group is more likely to hold
stock, compared to the younger age-group, when they have experienced higher stock-
market returns in their lives. The opposite holds when the returns experienced by the
younger generations are higher than those of the older generations. The slope coefficient
of the linear line of fit is significant at 5%. The steepness of the weighting function, and
hence the extent of imposed weight on recent data points, makes little difference, as the
comparison with graph (b) for λ = 3 reveals.
The analysis of the intensive margin of stock-market investment yields the same con-
clusion. Both graph (c) and graph (d) indicate that older generations invest a higher
share of the their liquid assets in stock, compared to the younger generations, when their
experienced returns have been higher than those of the younger age-group over their re-
spective life-spans so far; and vice versa when they have experienced lower returns than
the younger cohorts. Here, the slope coefficient is significant at 10%.
Figures 6 to 8 present the corresponding results for experienced dividends, earnings,
and GDP. For all measures, we observe a positive relation of differences in experienced
performance and stock investments between the young and the old. The fact that we
obtain very similar findings for a wide array of performance measures lends support to
21 The 1983-2013 SCF waves oversample high-income households with significant stock holdings. The
oversampling is helpful for our analysis of asset allocation, but could induce selection bias. By applying
SCF sample weights, we undo the over-weighting of high-income households and also adjust for non-
response bias.
39
(a) Stock-market participation (λ = 1) (b) Fraction invested in stock (λ = 1)
(c) Stock-market participation (λ = 3) (d) Fraction invested in stock (λ = 3)
Figure 5: Experienced Returns and Stock Holdings
Notes. Difference in experienced returns is calculated as the lifetime average experienced
returns of the S&P500 Index as given on Robert Shiller’s website, using declining weights
with either λ = 1 or λ = 3 as in equation (5). Stock-market participation is measured as
the fraction of households in the respective age groups that hold at least $1 of stock own-
ership, either as directly held stock or indirectly, e. g. via mutuals or retirement accounts.
Fraction invested in stock is the fraction of liquid assets stock-market participants invest
in the stock market. We classify households whose head is above 60 years of age as “old,”
and households whose head is below 40 years of age as “young.” Difference in stock hold-
ings, the y-axis in graphs (a) and (c), is calculated as the difference between the logs of
the fractions of stock holders among the old and among the young age group. Percentage
stock, the y-axis in graphs (b) and (d), is the difference in the fraction of liquid assets
invested in stock. The red line depicts the linear fit.
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(a) Stock-market participation (λ = 1) (b) Fraction invested in stock (λ = 1)
(c) Stock-market participation (λ = 3) (d) Fraction invested in stock (λ = 3)
Figure 6: Experienced Dividends and Stock Holdings
Notes. Difference in experienced dividends is calculated as the lifetime average experi-
enced real dividends as given on Robert Shiller’s website, using declining weights with
either λ = 1 or λ = 3 as in equation (5). Stock-market participation is measured as the
fraction of households in the respective age groups that hold at least $1 of stock owner-
ship, either as directly held stock or indirectly, e.g. via mutuals or retirement accounts.
Fraction invested in stock is the fraction of liquid assets stock-market participants invest
in the stock market. We classify households whose head is above 60 years of age as “old,”
and households whose head is below 40 years of age as “young.” Difference in stock hold-
ings, the y-axis in graphs (a) and (c), is calculated as the difference between the logs of
the fractions of stock holders among the old and among the young age group. Percentage
stock, the y-axis in graphs (b) and (d), is the difference in the fraction of liquid assets
invested in stock. The red line depicts the linear fit.
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(a) Stock-market participation (λ = 1) (b) Fraction invested in stock (λ = 1)
(c) Stock-market participation (λ = 3) (d) Fraction invested in stock (λ = 3)
Figure 7: Experienced Earnings and Stock Holdings
Notes. Difference in experienced earnings is calculated as the lifetime average experienced
log real earnings as given on Robert Shiller’s website, using declining weights with either
λ = 1 or λ = 3 as in equation (5). Stock-market participation is measured as the fraction
of households in the respective age groups that hold at least $1 of stock ownership, either
as directly held stock or indirectly, e.g. via mutuals or retirement accounts. Fraction
invested in stock is the fraction of liquid assets stock-market participants invest in the
stock market. We classify households whose head is above 60 years of age as “old,” and
households whose head is below 40 years of age as “young.” Difference in stock holdings,
the y-axis in graphs (a) and (c), is calculated as the difference between the logs of the
fractions of stock holders among the old and among the young age group. Percentage
stock, the y-axis in graphs (b) and (d), is the difference in the fraction of liquid assets
invested in stock. The red line depicts the linear fit.
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(a) Stock-market participation (λ = 1) (b) Fraction invested in stock (λ = 1)
(c) Stock-market participation (λ = 3) (d) Fraction invested in stock (λ = 3)
Figure 8: Experienced Log GDP and Stock Holdings
Notes. Difference in experienced GDP is calculated as the lifetime average experienced
log real GDP, using declining weights with either λ = 1 or λ = 3 as in equation (5).
Stock-market participation is measured as the fraction of households in the respective age
groups that hold at least $1 of stock ownership, either as directly held stock or indirectly,
e.g. via mutuals or retirement accounts. Fraction invested in stock is the fraction of liquid
assets stock-market participants invest in the stock market. We classify households whose
head is above 60 years of age as “old,” and households whose head is below 40 years of age
as “young.” Difference in stock holdings, the y-axis in graphs (a) and (c), is calculated
as the difference between the logs of the fractions of stock holders among the old and
among the young age group. Percentage stock, the y-axis in graphs (b) and (d), is the
difference in the fraction of liquid assets invested in stock. The red line depicts the linear
fit.
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(a) Linear weights (λ = 1)
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(b) Superlinear weights (λ = 3)
Figure 9: Trading Volume and Standard Deviation of Changes in Experienced Returns
Notes. Trading volume, shown in (dark) blue, is calculated as the market-capitalization
weighted average monthly turnover ratio (shares traded divided by shares outstanding)
across all firms in January and in December of the preceding year. We log, linearly
detrend, and CF-filter the yearly variable to obtain the deviation of turnover ratio from
the trend. Returns are defined as inflation-adjusted change in price from the prior year
divided by inflation-adjusted price in the prior year. Returns are linearly detrended
and CF filtered. After creating the experience variables for returns, we take the change
of the experience variable for individuals of a given age from the experience of those
individuals in the prior year. We then calculate the current-year age-cohort population
weighted standard deviation of this difference variable for each year as our measure of
experience-based disagreement.
the link between our theoretical model and the empirical facts, and ameliorates concerns
about dividends not translating one-to-one into an empirical performance measure.
Trade volume. We now turn to the second prediction, which relates trade volume to
the dispersion of changes in disagreement among investors. We calculate changes in the
level of disagreement as the cross-cohort standard deviation of the change in experienced
performance between the current year and the previous year. We weight the cohorts by
their sizes when computing the standard deviation.22
As a measure of abnormal trade volume, we calculate the deviation of the turnover ratio
22 For this, we obtain data on U.S. population by age between 1985 and 2015 from US Census Bureau.
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from its trend. Following prior literature (Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006), Lo and
Wang (2000)), we first compute firm-level turnover ratio, i. e., the number of shares traded
over the number of shares outstanding, on a monthly basis. We require that firms be listed
on the NYSE or AMEX. We exclude NASDAQ-listed firms because the dealer market has
volume measurement conventions that differ from exchange-traded securities (Atkins and
Dyl (1997), Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006)). Then, we aggregate these numbers
into a market-wide turnover ratio, weighting firms by their market capitalization.23 Since
the turnover ratio is non-stationary, we proceed in the same way as above and apply the
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) to the logarithm of the turnover ratio series, so that
we keep frequencies between 2 and 8 years. We examine the co-movement between the
aforementioned measure of disagreement, i. e., the standard deviation of the change in
experienced stock returns, and the above measures of (abnormal) trade volume.
Figure 9 displays the trade volume in dark (blue) color, and changes in the experience-
based disagreement about returns between cohorts in light (orange) color over time.
Graph (a) shows the results when we apply linear weights for the calculation of experi-
enced returns, and graph (b) displays the case with super-linear weights (λ = 3). Since
we work with annual data for our disagreement variable, we choose the average of the
turnover ratio in December of a given year and in January of the following year as our
measure for trading volume of the given year. That is, Figure 9 compares the variation
(standard deviation) in changes in experienced returns in a given year to trading volume
in December of that year and January of the following year. We choose 1985 as the
starting year for this analysis, since individual investors were trading substantially less
frequently when trading cost were significantly higher up to the mid-1980s, making it
less likely that (individual) investors trade repeatedly based on experienced performance.
Consistent with the predictions of our model, we observe a clear co-movement between
23 This measure is equivalent to dollar turnover ratio, i. e., the ratio of the dollar value of all shares
traded and the dollar value of the market.
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Table 3: Trading Volume and Changes in Experience-Based Disagreement
Experiences constructed using: Returns Dividends Log Earnings Log GDP
λ = 1 Correlation 0.5976 0.1788 0.3225 0.1780
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.3358) (0.0768) (0.3379)
λ = 3 Correlation 0.4904 0.1489 0.3099 0.1886
(p-value) (0.0051) (0.4240) (0.0898) (0.3096)
Notes. The table displays the pairwise correlations (and corresponding p-values in paren-
theses) of trading volume and eight measures of the change in experience-based disagree-
ment. Trading volume is calculated using the market-capitalization weighted average
turnover ratio (shares traded divided by shares outstanding) across all firms for January
of the current year and December of the preceding year (averaged). We log, linearly
detrend, and CF-filter the yearly variable. Experience-based disagreement is calculated
separately for returns, dividends, earnings, and GDP, where returns are defined as the
inflation-adjusted change in price from the prior year divided by inflation-adjusted price
in the prior year, and dividends, earnings, and GDP are inflation adjusted. Returns, div-
idends, log earnings, and log GDP are linearly detrended and CF-filtered, and experience
is calculated both with linear weights (λ=1) and with superlinear weights (λ = 3). For
each meaasure, we calculate the change in experience for individuals of a given age from
the experience of the same individuals in the prior year. We then calculate the current-
year age-cohort population-weighted standard deviation of the changes in experiences.
disagreement among cohorts and trading volume. Table 3 reveals that the co-movement
is statistically significant at 1%. The table presents the correlation between trading vol-
ume and our measures of changes in return disagreement, as well as the correlations when
disagreement is measured using our alternative performance measures, i. e., using again
dividends, earnings, or GDP. In each case, the correlation coefficient is again positive,
albeit (marginally) significant only for changes in disagreement in experienced earnings.
The relationship between trade volume and changes in disagreement in experience-
based beliefs about future returns in Table 3 and Figure 9, as well as the directionally
similar correlations with the disagreement about other proxies for returns, corroborate
the empirical relevance of our model for a better understanding of investor behavior.
The pattern is consistent with experience-based learning and suggests that our novel
explanation is worth considering. Moreover, as long as we assume that people trade
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based on their beliefs, it is unlikely that our channel is spurious. At the same time,
other variables might also affect both the change in beliefs and the fluctuations in the
trade volume. For example, if fluctuation in trade volume is caused both by variability
in change in the beliefs (our model), and by another business-cycle macro variable, and
both factors are positively correlated, we might still obtain a graph similar to Figure
9. The claim in this section is not that there are no such factors, nor even that we
can attribute most or all of the correlation depicted in Figure 9 to belief-based learning.
Instead, the conclusion is that all empirical findings in this section are consistent with
experience-based learning and suggest experience-based learning as a novel and relevant
factor that helps explain these empirical regularities jointly.
For a more detailed and careful empirical analysis it will be useful to analyze long-
term individual-level panel data, which allows to link cumulative experiences and new
experiences to trading decisions in the corresponding year.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an OLG equilibrium framework to study the effect
of personal experiences on market dynamics. We incorporate the two main empirical
features of experience effects, the over-weighing of lifetime experiences and recency bias,
into the belief formation process of agents. We show that experience-based learning
not only generates several well-known asset pricing puzzles, that have been observed
in the data, but it also produces new testable predictions about the relation between
demographics, prices trading behavior, and the cross-section of asset holdings, which
are in line with the data. We highlight two channels through which shocks have long-
lasting effects on economic outcomes. The first is the belief formation process: all agents
update their beliefs about the future after experiencing a given shock. The second is
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the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the population: different experiences generate belief
heterogeneity. We illustrate how the demographic composition of an economy can have
important implications for the extent to which prices depend on past dividends. We
consider this paper to be a first step into the exploration of the role of demographics in
understanding market dynamics.
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Appendix A Proofs for Results in Section 2
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Let ∆(k) ≡ w(k, λ, age) − w(k, λ, age′) for all k ∈ {0, ..., age}. We need
to show that ∃k0 ∈ {0, ..., age′} such that ∆(k) < 0 for all k ≤ k0, and ∆(k) ≥ 0 for all k > k0,
with the last inequality holding strictly for some k.
For k > age′, ∆(k) > 0 since w(k, λ, age′) ≡ 0, and hence ∆(k) = w(k, λ, age) > 0, for all
k ∈ {age′ + 1, ..., age}.
For k ≤ age′, we note that ∆(k) > 0 ⇐⇒ Q(k) := w(k,λ,age)w(k,λ,age′) > 1. Hence, it remains to be
shown that ∃k0 ∈ {0, ..., age′} such that Q(k) < 1 for all k ≤ k0, and Q(k) ≥ 1 for all k > k0.
Since the normalizing constants used in the weights w(k, λ, age) are independent of k (see the
definition in (5)), we absorb them in a constant c ∈ R+ and rewrite
Q(k) = c · (age+ 1− k)
λ
(age′ + 1− k)λ = c ·
[ age+ 1− k
age′ + 1− k
]λ
= c · α(k)λ ∀k ∈ {0, ..., age′}. (26)
The function x 7→ α(x) = age+1−xage′+1−x has derivative α′(x) = age−age
′
(age′+1−x)2 > 0 for x ∈ [0, age′+1),
and hence Q(·) is strictly increasing over {0, ..., age′}. Thus, to complete the proof, we only
have to show that Q(k) < 1 or, equivalently, ∆(k) < 0 for some k ∈ {0, ..., age′}. We know that∑age
k=0 ∆(k) = 0 because
∑age
k=0w(k, λ, age) =
∑age′
k=0w(k, λ, age
′) = 1, and we also know that∑age
k=age′+1 ∆(k) > 0 since ∆(k) = w(k, λ, age) > 0 for all k ∈ {age′+ 1, ..., age}. Hence, it must
be that ∆(k) < 0 for some k < age′.
Appendix B Proofs for Results in Section 4
Proposition 4.1 directly follows from the following Lemma.
Lemma B.1. Let z ∼ N(µ, σ2), then for any a > 0,
x∗ = arg max
x
E[− exp{−axz}] = µ
aσ2
and
max
x
E[− exp{−axz}] =− exp
{
−1
2
(σax∗)2
}
= − exp
(
−1
2
µ2
σ2
)
.
Proof of Lemma B.1. Since z ∼ N(µ, σ2), we can rewrite the problem as follows:
x∗ = arg max
x
− exp
(
−axE[z] + 1
2
a2x2V [z]
)
= arg max
x
axµ− 1
2
a2x2σ2
From FOC, x∗ = µ
aσ2
. Plugging x∗ into − exp (−ax∗µ+ 12a2(x∗)2σ2) the second result follows.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. We show the result for the guess pt = α + β0dt + ... + βKdt−K with
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K = q. This case shows the logic of the proof; the proof for the case starting from an arbitrary
lag K ≥ q is analogous but more involved, and omitted for simplicity.
From Lemma B.1, agents’ demand for the risky asset is given by xnt =
Ent [st+1]
γV [st+1]
. Plugging in
our guess for prices, and for β0 6= −1, we obtain:
xnt =
(1 + β0) θ
n
t + α+ β1dt + ...+ βqdt−q+1 − ptR
γ (1 + β0)
2 σ2
(27)
By market clearing, 1q
∑t
n=t−q+1 x
n
t = 1, which implies that
(1 + β0)
1
q
∑t
n=t−q+1 θ
n
t
γ (1 + β0)
2 σ2
+
α+ β1dt + ...+ βqdt−q+1 − ptR
γ (1 + β0)
2 σ2
= 1.
By straightforward algebra and the definition of θnt , it follows that
(1 + β0)
1
q
t∑
n=t−q+1
[
t−n∑
k=0
w (k, λ, t− n) dt−k
]
+
[
α− γ (1 + β0)2 σ2
]
+ β1dt + ...+ βqdt−q+1 = ptR.
Plugging in (again) our guess for pt and using the method of undetermined coefficients, we find
the expressions for α and the β’s:
−γ (1 + β0)
2 σ2
R− 1 = α (28)
(1 + β0)
1
q
t−k∑
n=t−q+1
w (k, λ, t− n) + βk+1 = βkR ∀k ∈ {0, 1, ..., q − 1} (29)
0 = βqR. (30)
Let wk be the average of the weights assigned to dividend dt−k by each generation in the
market at time t, i.e., wk =
1
q
∑t
n=t−q+1w (k, λ, t− n). Given that a weight of zero is assigned
to dividends that a generation did not observe, i.e., for k > t − n, we can rewrite wk =
1
q
∑t−k
n=t−q+1w (k, λ, t− n). Also using βq = 0 from equation (45) we obtain:
(1 + β0)wk + βk+1 = βkR ∀k ∈ {0, 1, ..., q − 2} (31)
(1 + β0)wq−1 = βq−1R (32)
By solving this system of equations, we obtain the expressions in the proposition. In particular,
(1 + β0) (wq−2 +wq−1/R) = βq−2R for k = q−2, (1 + β0) (wq−3 +wq−2/R+wq−1/R2) = βq−3R
for k = q − 3, and so on. This allow us to express (31) and (32) as
(1 + β0)
k−1∑
j=0
wq−(k−j)/Rj = βq−kR for k = 1, ..., q. (33)
The last expression (33) implies β0 =
∑q−1
j=0 wj/R
j
R−∑q−1j=0 wj/Rj =
∑q−1
j=0 wj/R
j+1
1−∑q−1j=0 wj/Rj+1 (from plugging in k = q),
which in turn, plugged into (43) allows us to obtain the expression for α from (15) in Proposition
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4.2. And expression (33) implies βk =
∑q−1−k
j=0 wk+j/R
j+1
1−∑q−1j=0 wj/Rj+1 (from substituting k with q − k, and
using the expression for β0) as expressed in equation (16) of the Proposition. The latter also
subsumes equation (32), solved for βq−1, and the above formula for β0, and hence holds for
k = 0, ...q − 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. For this proof, we use equations (31) and (32). In addition, note that
by construction, wk < wk−1 for λ > 0 since for all generations, w(k, λ, age) is decreasing in k
and more agents observe the realization of dt−(k−1) than dt−k. Given this, it follows that since
β0 > 0 then βq−1 > 0 and
βq−1 =
1
R
(1 + β0)wq−1 <
1
R
[(1 + β0)wq−2 + βq−1] = βq−2 (34)
In addition, if βk < βk−1, then:
βk−1 =
1
R
[(1 + β0)wk−1 + βk] <
1
R
[(1 + β0)wk−2 + βk−1] = βk−2 (35)
Thus, the proof that βk < βk−1 for all k ∈ {1, ..., q − 1} follows by induction.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. To show that β0 is increasing in λ, let Gq(λ) =
∑q−1
k=0wk/R
k+1. We thus
have β0 =
Gq(λ)
1−Gq(λ) , and it suffices to show that G
′
q(λ) > 0 ∀q > 0 and ∀λ > 0. After some
algebra, the terms in Gq(·) can be re-organized as follows:
Gq(λ) =
q−1∑
age=0
1
q
age∑
k=0
w(k, λ, age)/Rk+1 (36)
Note that for any age ∈ {0, ..., q−1}: (i) ∑agek=0w(k, λ, age) = 1 and (ii) for any λ1, λ2 such that
λ1 > λ2 > 0,
∑age
k=j w(k, λ1, age) <
∑age
k=j w(k, λ2, age). Thus, the weight distribution given
by λ2 first-order stochastically dominates the weight distribution given by λ1. Since 1/R >
1/R2 > 1/R3 > ... > 1/Rq−1, stochastic dominance implies that for all age ∈ {0, ..., q − 1},∑age
k=0 c
k+1w(k, λ1, age) >
∑age
k=0 c
k+1w(k, λ2, age), and thus Gq(λ1) > Gq(λ2).
To show the limit results, note that limλ→∞w(0, λ, age) = 1, while limλ→∞w(k, λ, age) = 0
for all k > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. From Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, we know that, for any t, any genera-
tions m ≥ n both in {t− q + 1, ..., t} and any k ∈ {0, ...., q − 1},
∂(xnt − xmt )
∂dt−k
=
(1 + β0)
γV [st+1]
∂(θnt − θmt )
∂dt−k
.
We note that, for any n ∈ {t − q + 1, ..., t}, ∂θnt∂dt−k = w(k, λ, n − t) if k ∈ {0, ..., t − n}, and
∂θnt
∂dt−k = 0 if k ∈ {t − n + 1, ..., q − 1}. (Observe that t − n ≤ q − 1.) Hence, it suffices to
compare w(k, λ, t−n) with w(k, λ, t−m) for any k ∈ {0, ..., q−1}. (As usual, here we adopt the
convention that for any age, w(k, λ, age) = 0 for all k ≥ age.) From Lemma 2.1, there exists a
k0 such that w(k, λ, t−n) < w(k, λ, t−m) for all k ∈ {0, ..., k0} and w(k, λ, t−n) ≥ w(k, λ, t−m)
for the rest of the k’s, k ∈ {k0 + 1, ..., q − 1}.
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The proof of Proposition 4.5 relies on the following first-order stochastic dominance result:
Lemma B.2. For any a ∈ {0, 1, ...}, a′ < a and any m ∈ {0, ..., a}, let F (m, a) ≡∑m
j=0w(j, λ, a). Suppose the conditions of Lemma 2.1 hold; then F (m, a) ≤ F (m, a′) for
all m ∈ {0, ..., a}.
Proof of Lemma B.2. From Lemma 2.1, we know that there exists a unique j0 where
w(j0, λ, a
′) − w(j0, λ, a) “crosses” zero. Thus, for m ≤ j0, the result is true because
w(j, λ, a′) > w(j, λ, a) for all j ∈ {0, ...m}. For m > j0, the result follows from the fact
that w(j, λ, a′) < w(j, λ, a) for all j ∈ {m, ...a} and F (a, a) = F (a′, a′) = 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. We first introduce some notation. For any j ∈ {t−n−k+1, ..., t−n},
let w(j, λ, t− n− k) = 0; i. e., we define the weights of generation n+ k for time periods before
they were born to be zero. Thus,
∑t−n−k
j=0 w(j, λ, t − n − k)dt−j =
∑t−n
j=0 w(j, λ, t − n − k)dt−j .
In addition, we note that (w(j, λ, t−n− k))t−nj=0 and (w(j, λ, t−n))t−nj=0 are sequences of positive
weights that add to one.
Let for any m ∈ {0, ..., t− n},
F (m, t− n− k) =
m∑
j=0
w(j, λ, t− n− k) and F (m, t− n) =
m∑
j=0
w(j, λ, t− n).
These quantities, as functions ofm, are non-decreasing and F (t−n, t−n−k) = F (t−n, t−n) = 1.
Moreover, F (m+ 1, t− n− k)−F (m, t− n− k) = w(m+ 1, λ, t− n− k) and F (m+ 1, t− n)−
F (m, t− n) = w(m+ 1, λ, t− n). Finally, we set F (−1, t− n) = F (−1, t− n− k) = 0.
By these observations, by the definition of ξ(n, k, t), and by straightforward algebra, it follows
that,
ξ(n, k, t)
=
∑t−n
m=0(F (m, t− n)− F (m− 1, t− n))dt−m −
∑t−n
m=0(F (m, t− n− k)− F (m− 1, t− n− k))dt−m
γ(1 + β0)σ2
=
∑t−n−1
j=0 (dt−j − dt−j−1)(F (j, t− n)− F (j, t− n− k))
γ(1 + β0)σ2
.
If the weights are non-decreasing, then dt−j − dt−j−1 ≥ 0 for all j = 0, ..., t − n − 1, and it
suffices to show that F (j, t− n) ≤ F (j, t− n− k) for all j = 0, ..., t− n− 1. This follows from
applying Lemma B.2 with a = t− n > t− n− k = a′.
If the weights are non-increasing, then dt−j − dt−j−1 ≤ 0, and the sign of ξ(n, k, t) changes
accordingly.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. By Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, it follows that for any t and n ≤ t,
xnt =
1
γσ2 (1 + β0)
2
(
α0(1−R) + (1 + β0)θnt −Rβ0dt +
q−1∑
k=1
βk(dt+1−k −Rdt−k)
)
. (37)
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Thus, for n ∈ {t− q + 1, ..., t− 1},
xnt − xnt−1 =
(1 + β0)(θ
n
t − θnt−1) + T (dt:t−q)
γσ2 (1 + β0)
2 (38)
where T (dt:t−q) ≡
∑q−1
k=1 βk(dt+1−k − dt−k − R(dt−k − dt−1−k)) − Rβ0(dt − dt−1). Note that
T (dt:t−q) is not cohort specific, i.e., does not depend on n.
The fact that xtt − xtt−1 = xtt and xt−qt − xt−qt−1 = −xt−qt−1, and market clearing imply
q−1
(
t∑
n=t−q
xnt − xnt−1
)
= 0. (39)
This expression and the expression in (38) imply that
1
q
 t−1∑
n=t−q+1
(1 + β0)(θ
n
t − θnt−1)
γσ2 (1 + β0)
2 + x
t
t − xt−qt−1
 = −1
q
t∑
n=t−q
T (dt:t−q)
γσ2 (1 + β0)
2 = −
T (dt:t−q)
γσ2 (1 + β0)
2 .
Letting θtt−1 = θ
t−q
t = 0, it follows that
1
q
(
t∑
n=t−q
(1 + β0)(θ
n
t − θnt−1)
)
= −T (dt:t−q).
Thus, we can express the change in individual demands for those agents with n = {t − q +
1, ..., t− 1} in expression (38) as follows:
xnt − xnt−1 = χ
[(
θnt − θnt−1
)− 1
q
t∑
n=t−q
(
θnt − θnt−1
)]
, ∀n ∈ {t, ..., t− q} (40)
where χ ≡ 1
γσ2(1+β0)
. By squaring and summing at both sides and including the demands on
the youngest (n = t) and oldest (n = t− q) market participants the desired result follows.
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Appendix C Incorporating Prior Beliefs
In this section, we show how the model can be extended to allow agents to have prior
beliefs; that is, τ > 0 in (4). We will prove results analogous to those in Proposition 4.2.
As a reminder, we now suppose that all cohorts are born with prior belief N(m,σ2m),
and update their beliefs during their lifetime as follows:
θnt = (1− ωt−n)m+ ωt−n
[
t−n∑
k=0
w (k, λ, t− n) dt−k
]
(41)
where ωt−n is given by
ωt−n =
t− n+ 1
τ + (t− n+ 1) ,
and where τ captures the relative importance of prior beliefs to experience-based beliefs.
For example, if agents are Bayesian from experience as described in Section 2.1, then
τ = σ
2
σ2m
. For the purpose of our analysis, however, all that is important is how results
vary with τ .
We continue to guess that prices are affine in past dividends,
pt = α + β0dt + ...+ βKdt−K
with K = q, as in the baseline model. From Lemma B.1, agents’ demand for the risky
asset is given by xnt =
Ent [st+1]
γV [st+1]
. Plugging in our guess for prices, and for β0 6= −1, we
obtain:
xnt =
(1 + β0) θ
n
t + α + β1dt + ...+ βqdt−q+1 − ptR
γ (1 + β0)
2 σ2
(42)
By market clearing, 1
q
∑t
n=t−q+1 x
n
t = 1, which implies that
(1 + β0)
1
q
∑t
n=t−q+1 θ
n
t
γ (1 + β0)
2 σ2
+
α + β1dt + ...+ βqdt−q+1 − ptR
γ (1 + β0)
2 σ2
= 1.
By straightforward algebra and the definition of θnt , it follows that
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(
1
γ (1 + β0)
2 σ2
)[
(1 + β0)
1
q
t∑
n=t−q+1
θnt + α + β1dt + ...+ βqdt−q+1 − ptR
]
= 1
(1 + β0)
1
q
t∑
n=t−q+1
[
(1− ωt−n)m+ ωt−n
t−n∑
k=0
w (k, λ, t− n) dt−k
]
+ α− γ (1 + β0)2 σ2...
+β1dt + ...+ βqdt−q+1 = ptR.[
(1 + β0)
1
q
t∑
n=t−q+1
(1− ωt−n)m+ α− γ (1 + β0)2 σ2
]
+ ...
(1 + β0)
1
q
t∑
n=t−q+1
t−n∑
k=0
ωt−nw (k, λ, t− n) dt−k + β1dt + ...+ βqdt−q+1 = ptR.
Plugging in (again) our guess for pt and using the method of undetermined coefficients,
we find the expressions for α and the β’s:
γ (1 + β0)
2 σ2 + (1 + β0)
1
q
∑t
n=t−q+1(1− ωt−n)m
1−R = α (43)
(1 + β0)
1
q
t−k∑
n=t−q+1
ωt−nw (k, λ, t− n) + βk+1 = βkR ∀k ∈ {0, 1, ..., q − 1} (44)
0 = βqR. (45)
Where wk is now the average of the weights assigned to dividend dt−k by each generation
in the market at time t, i.e., wk =
1
q
∑t
n=t−q+1 ωt−nw (k, λ, t− n).
Introducing prior beliefs requires two adjustments. First, the constant in prices, α, now
increases to incorporate the demand driven by prior belief, m. Second, all the weights
that an agent with age t−n gives to past dividends are now adjusted by ω(t−n), which
keeps track of the importance that these agents assign to their experience-based learning.
Such adjustment affects the β′s in the pricing equation. Given these adjustments, the
model is isomorphic to the baseline model.
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Appendix D Population Growth
In addition to considering the effects of a one-time shock to population structure, we also
explore the implications of population growth.
In this section of the Online Appendix, we consider an OLG model two-period lived
agents where the mass of young agents born every period grows at rate g. For this growth
setting, we need to set an initial date for the economy, which we define to be t = 0. Let
yt denote the mass of young agents born at time t; then yt+1 = (1 + g) yt = y0(1 + g)
t.
We further denote the total mass of people at any point in time t > 0 as nt, and hence
nt = yt + yt−1 = (2 + g) yt−1. It is easy to check that nt = (1 + g)nt−1; that is, total
population grows at rate g.
The framework is otherwise as in the ‘toy model” in Section 3 of the main paper. The
main difference is that now population is growing over time. As a result, we make a
different guess for the price function:
pt = α0 (1 + g)
−t + β0dt + β1dt−1
We verify this guess using our market clearing condition, which requires the demand of
the young and the old to add up to total supply of the asset, one:
1 = yt
Ett [pt+1 + dt+1]−Rpt
γV [pt+1 + dt+1]
+ yt−1
Et−1t [pt+1 + dt+1]−Rpt
γV [pt+1 + dt+1]
⇐⇒
1 =
y0 (1 + g)
t−1
γ (1 + β0)
2 σ2
[
(1 + β0)
[
(1 + g)Ett [dt+1] + E
t−1
t [dt+1]
]
+ (2 + g)
[
α0 (1 + g)
−(t+1) + β1dt −Rpt
]]
and after simple algebra,
Rpt = (1 + β0)
{
1 + g
2 + g
dt +
1
2 + g
[(1− ω) dt−1 + ωdt]
}
+
α0
(1 + g)t+1
+ β1dt − γσ
2(1 + β0)
2
y0 (2 + g) (1 + g)
t−1
We plug in pt = α0 (1 + g)
−t + β0dt + β1dt−1 and we use the method of undetermined
coefficients to obtain:
α0 = −γ (1 + β0)
2 σ2
R− 1
1+g
(1 + g)
y0 (2 + g)
Rβ0 = (1 + β0)
(
1 + g
2 + g
+
1
2 + g
ω
)
+ β1
Rβ1 = (1 + β0)
1− ω
2 + g
Let αt ≡ α0(1 + g)−t and γ ≡ ytnt denote the fraction of young agents, which is easy to
verity is constant over time. Then, we can rewrite the above equations as
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αt = −γ (1 + β0)
2 σ2
R− 1
1+g
1 + g
nt
Rβ0 = (1 + β0) (γ + (1− γ)ω) + β1
Rβ1 = (1 + β0) (1− γ)(1− ω).
The latter expressions reveal that the total mass of agents in the market is reflected
only in the price constant, while the fraction of young people in the market determines
the dividend loadings β0 and β1. Overall, we see that adding population growth generates
to our model generates a positive trend in prices. The relative reliance of prices on the
most recent experiences (dividends) is increasing in the population growth rate.
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Appendix E Empirical Analysis
We use two alternative approaches to measure the fraction of younger agents (below
50 years of age) in the market. First, we compute an indicator variable that equals
one when the fraction of young agents in the market is above 0.5 and zero otherwise,
I{Fraction of young investorst > 0.5}. Here, the fraction of young investors is based on
their relative cohort sizes, with
Fraction of young investorst =
∑
j I(agej,t < 50) · wscfj,t∑
j=1w
scf
j,t
,
where agej,t is the age of household head j in year t, and w
scf
j,t is the weight given to
household head j in year t in the Survey of Consumer Finance to compensate for unequal
probabilities of household selection in the original design and for unit nonresponse (failure
to obtain an interview).
Our second proxy captures the wealth of younger generations of investors. We construct
an indicator variable that equals 1 when the fraction of liquid wealth owned by agents
below 50 is above the 1960-2013 sample average of their liquid wealth and zero otherwise,
I(Fraction of young investors’ wealtht > Sample average),24 i. e.,
Fraction of young investors’ wealtht =
∑
j I(agej,t < 50) · wscfj,t ·Wealthj,t∑
j w
scf
j,t ·Wealthj,t
For robustness, we also consider thresholds 0.55 and 0.60 for the age-based first proxy,
and 0.9×Sample average and 1.1×Sample average for the age- and wealth-based second
proxy. Results are presented in Online-Appendix Table OA.1. We estimate a positive δ1
coefficient, which is significant when requiring a fraction of 0.6 for the age-based coefficient
and when requiring wealth above 0.9 of the sample average for the age- and wealth-based
coefficient.
24 The SCF documents the age and wealth (liquid assets) information of each respondent in 1960,
1962, 1963, 1964, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1977, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004,
2007, 2010, and 2013. We use linear interpolation to fill the missing years and construct a yearly sample
from 1960 to 2013. The liquid assets variable is defined to be the sum of assets in an investor’s checking,
savings, and money-market accounts, as well as any call accounts at brokerages and prepaid cards.
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Table OA.1: Markov-Switching Regime (MSR) model
Robustness checks of the estimation results in Table 2. pt−dt is the log of the price-to-dividend
ratio, and regressed on its lagged values interacted with the demographic indicator variable Yt
for the fraction of young investors. We use different thresholds to construct Yt. In column (1),
Yt equals 1 when the fraction of investors below 50 is larger than 0.55, and in column (2), the
threshold is 0.60. In column (3), Yt equals 1 when the fraction of wealth of investors below 50
is larger than 90% of their 1960-2013 sample average, and in column (4), the threshold is 110%
of the sample average. As in Table 2, the demographic data including age and wealth (liquid
assets) of stock-market participants is from the SCF, stock data from Robert Shiller’s website.
Dependent variable: pt − dt
Yt age-based Yt age/wealth-based
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δ1 0.430 1.134** 0.681** -0.339
(0.288) (0.188) (0.209) (0.268)
δ2 0.016 -0.194 -0.082 -0.137
(0.304) (0.322) (0.210) (0.422)
δ3 -0.460** -0.778** -0.629** 0.428*
(0.225) (0.282) (0.161) (0.220)
β1 0.623** 0.297** 0.417** 1.084**
(0.259) (0.134) (0.177) (0.081)
β2 -0.099 -0.132 -0.168 -0.223**
(0.219) (0.140) (0.166) (0.100)
β3 0.298** 0.452** 0.580** -0.044
(0.151) (0.106) (0.140) (0.064)
µ(S1) 4.925** 5.780** 5.734** 5.430**
(1.541) (2.915) (1.513) (1.683)
µ(S2) 19.590** 14.100** 20.310** 19.670**
(3.399) (2.959) (3.144) (3.102)
σ 3.948 3.259 3.792 3.737
(0.392) (0.393) (0.397) (0.375)
Q11 0.953 0.779 0.956 0.931
(0.030) (0.152) (0.026) (0.035)
Q21 0.374 0.115 0.365 0.473
(0.214) (0.068) (0.210) (0.220)
N 51 51 51 51
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.
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